The Fall of Fojnica
Having been stymied in their attempt to force a passage through the Kisel-jak area along the Tarcin-Toplica-Tulica-Han Ploca axis, the ABiH refo-cused their attacks to the west toward Kresevo and Fojnica.6 The HVO forces defending in the Fojnica-Kresevo area included the Ban Josip Jelacic Brigade's 2d and 3d Battalions. The brigade, commanded by Ivica Rajic, had a total strength of about twenty-five hundred men. The brigade's 1st Battalion was responsible for the northern front toward Visoko....
Preparatory Operations
The ABiH's April attack in the Lasva Valley was preceded by a number of incidents that call to mind the classic Spetsnaz operations prescribed by Soviet and JNA offensive doctrine and which serve to clarify the fact that, contrary to the usual opinion, the ABiH, not the HVO, initiated the fighting in central Bosnia on April 16, 1993. These incidents were designed to probe and fix local HVO defensive positions, gain control of terrain features critical to the success of the planned operation,...
Preface
Everyone loves an underdog, real or imagined, particularly if that under- xvii dog can be portrayed as the thoroughly innocent victim of sinister and numerous attackers following a premeditated plan of conquest and annihilation. Such a simplistic, Manichean explanation of complex events is both easy to construct and easy to understand. Thus, the portrayal of the Bosnian Muslims and the fledgling Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina RBiH as the blameless victims of both Bosnian Serb Chetniks and...
Criminal Activities
The state of general chaos engendered by the defensive war against the BSA, the internal conflicts in central Bosnia, and the general availability of weapons significantly increased the opportunities and rewards for common criminal activity in the region, a factor that further degraded the HVO and ABiH commanders' ability to exercise effective command and control.31 Croatian Defense Council authorities recognized the situation in a mid-1993 report, which noted The law and order situation in the...
The HVO Intelligence Estimates
Stewart later testified that he did not expect the outbreak of a major conflict between the Muslims and Croats in the Lasva Valley.1 However, the HVO authorities, having been caught flat-footed by the ABiH probing attack in January, were not surprised. The targeting of the ABiH for intelligence purposes began soon after the January 20-21 attacks, and on March 25 Ivica Zeko, the intelligence officer at HQ, OZCB, issued an intelligence estimate that accurately forecasted the nature, direction,...
Events in the Vares Area
In October and November, 1993, the focus of the Muslim-Croat conflict shifted to the mining chrome, iron, and zinc and metal-processing town of Vares, which lies in a narrow valley some twenty miles north of Sarajevo on the main road from Breza to Tuzla and was then just to the west of the Serb lines. Both the Muslim and Croat residents of Vares maintained relatively good relations with the Serbs, and there was a heavy traffic in smuggled persons and goods across the opposing lines east of...
The Role of Outside Forces
Real or imagined, the presence in central Bosnia of armed forces from outside the country also posed significant problems for both the Operative Zone Central Bosnia commander and the commander of the ABiH III Corps. Allegations of Croatian Army HV intervention in central Bosnia posed a political and public relations problem, but the presence of fundamentalist Muslim mujahideen and of other foreign mercenaries and the presence of UNPROFOR troops and both United Nations and European Community...
The Role of Paramilitary Forces
Homegrown paramilitary forces also posed a significant command and control problem for both the HVO and the ABiH. Several of the Bosnian political parties sponsored their own armed forces, and there were also a number of small, private armies raised by Croat and Muslim leaders. Such groups, some of which were little more than heavily armed bandit gangs, were impossible to restrain, short of mounting an all-out campaign to annihilate them. The principal paramilitary organization posing a control...
The ABiH Attacks at Kacuni and Busovaca
The two principal objectives of the Muslim probing attacks launched from the villages of Merdani, Lasva, and Dusina in January, 1993, were the village of Kacuni on the important Busovaca-Kiseljak road and the town of Busovaca itself. The intent of the ABiH attackers was to seize Kacuni and thus sever the connection between Kiseljak and the rest of the Croat enclave in central Bosnia. Busovaca was a key Croat political center and controlled the road net west to Vitez and Travnik, east to the...
Continuation of the ABiH Offensive in the Kiseljak Area
The Kiseljak area was cut off from the Croat enclave in the Lasva Valley including Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca in late January, 1993, when the ABiH seized Kacuni. Thereafter, ground communication between the Vitez-Busovaca area and the Kiseljak area was very difficult, and HVO forces in the Kiseljak enclave operated almost independently. Until the summer of 1993, most of the Muslim-Croat fighting in the Kiseljak area occurred in the north, particularly in the Gomionica area in...
Organization of the Army of BosniaHerzegovina
The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina began its existence in March, 1992, without an effective national armed force to protect its fragile independence. The Bosnian Croat community, which had long recognized the threat posed by Bosnian Serb ambitions, reacted by forming the Croatian Defense Council, the military wing of which was established officially in May, 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim political leadership, on the other hand, had been slow to recognize the threat. As a consequence, the...
The Active Defense in the Vitez Area
In the early morning hours of April 15 the ABiH launched an attack on HVO positions on Mount Kuber north of Busovaca that resulted in three HVO soldiers killed in action KIA .20 In view of the increase in incidents, the kidnapping of the four HVO personnel in Novi Travnik and of Zivko Totic, and the ABiH attack on Mount Kuber, Col. Tihomir Blaskic, the commander of Operative Zone Central Bosnia, made an estimate of the situation and issued a series of orders on April 15 preparing his forces for...
The ABiH Strategic Offensive Plan
Although its author and the date of its creation remain uncertain, events clearly reveal the existence of an ABiH strategic offensive against the HVO in central Bosnia that began in mid-January, 1993, and continued in several phases until the signing of the Washington Agreements in late February, 1994. The strategic objectives of the plan were 1. To gain control of the north-south lines of communication LOCs passing through the Bosnian Croat enclave in central Bosnia, thereby linking the ABiH...
The Fall of Travnik
The expected resumption of the Muslim offensive came at the end of the first week of June, when elements of eight ABiH brigades struck the HVO forces manning the defensive line against the Bosnian Serb Army in the Travnik area.21 The Muslim attack achieved tactical surprise and was completely successful, capturing the HVO positions and driving the surviving HVO soldiers and thousands of terrified Croat civilians into the hands of the Serbs, who took them prisoner.22 Tensions between Muslims and...
The ABiH Attack in the Busovaca Area
The town of Busovaca and the road junction at Kacuni were important ABiH objectives during the probing attacks in late January, 1993. Although elements of the ABiH 333d Mountain Brigade seized control of the Kacuni intersection and took up positions overlooking Busovaca from the east, they were unsuccessful in taking either the Kaonik road junction north of Busovaca or the town itself, both of which the HVO vigorously defended. In the Muslim offensive that began on April 16, Busovaca and the...
The ABiH Attack on Zepce Zavidovici and Novi Seher JuneJuly 1993
Having successfully attacked and cleansed the HVO troops and Bosnian Croat civilians from Travnik and most of the Novi Travnik area in early June 1993, the Muslim-led ABiH turned its attention northward hoping to catch the isolated Bosnian Croat community in the Tesanj-Maglaj salient off guard. On June 24, the ABiH III Corps launched an attack on the town of Zepce and other HVO positions at the base of the salient.10 The Muslim assessment of the weakness of the Croat defenders of Zepce proved...
The Battle for Novi Travnik
Having routed the HVO forces and secured their objectives in the Travnik area, the ABiH mounted a serious attack against HVO forces in the Novi Travnik area. At 5 a.m. on June 9, the 308th Mountain Brigade from Novi Travnik some 2,100-3,100 men commanded by Bislim Zurapi , assisted by elements of the 307th Mountain Brigade from Bugojno and the 317th Mountain Brigade from Gornji Vakuf, as well as parts of the El Mudzahid mujahideen group, the Sosna private army about 100 men , a company from the...
Info Hqr
Formed from Bobovac Bde surrendered to ABiH, 14 6 93
The FebruaryMarch Pause
With a typical rush to judgment, Lt. Col. Bob Stewart, the UNPROFOR commander in the Lasva Valley, misread the situation on January 25, opining that both sides were having a go at each other Croats in Busovaca Muslims in Kacuni.19 In fact, it was the Muslims who were having a go at the Croats in Kacuni, in Busovaca, and in the Kiseljak area. When all was said and done, the HVO and Croat population in the area paid the heaviest toll for the January fighting the Croat villages of Nezirovici,...
The ABiH Attack in the Kiseljak Area
The April, 1993, Muslim attack in the Kiseljak area also developed much as Ivica Zeko, the OZCB intelligence officer, had predicted almost a month earlier. The HQ, OZCB, preparatory order issued at 10 a.m. on April 15 accurately forecast the details of the Muslim operational plan.44 As expected, the ABiH focused its April attack on occupying the BM 661-Svinjarevo-Mladenovac-Gomionica area, cutting the Busovaca-Kiseljak road at the Foj-nica intersection just west of Gomionica, and linking up...
Organization of the Croatian Defense Forces
The organization, arming, and military training of the Croat community in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in 1991 when the Bosnian Croats realized that they were next on the Serb agenda and that the newly independent Re public of Bosnia-Herzegovina's government, led by Alija Izetbegovic, and its Muslim population were either incapable of or unwilling to take decisive defensive measures against a probable attack by the Bosnian Serbs and their allies.18 At the time, the Muslim-dominated government in...
Hac Bosnia And Herzegovina
Source HQ, Vitez Military District, Vitez, n.d. February 2 , 1993, subj Assessment of the Situation Table, Ratios of Forces and Equipment by Locality , 21, KC D59 2. Source HQ, Vitez Military District, Vitez, n.d. February 2 , 1993, subj Assessment of the Situation Table, Ratios of Forces and Equipment by Locality , 21, KC D59 2. items was a very important, if limited, part of the logistical chain. Prior to the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict, HVO forces in central Bosnia were relatively...
The Impact of Political Influence
The lack of consistent political guidance from above and the strong influence of local political authorities on such matters as the selection and dismissal of commanders also weakened the command and control systems of both the HVO and the ABiH. Brigadier Marin addressed the problem directly in his testimony in the Blaskic trial before the ICTY By way of an example, if you wanted to appoint a brigade commander, before doing anything else, the commander of the Operative Zone had to reach...